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In fact, in the cases that arose in the four year period between White
Motor and Schwinn, the lower courts, applying the "rule of reason"
have permitted vertical restraints where there was economic justifica-
tion and the restraints did not in fact unduly restrict competition. 42
Hopefully the Court will review the position it has taken in Schwinn
and apply the test of reasonableness to situations where a manufacturer
employs vertical restrictions and passes title to his distributors and re-
tailers until examination of these restrictions proves them to be anti-
competitive in nature and without redeeming value, and truly deserving
a per se illegal ruling.
THOMAS M. PLACE
Bradley v. State: The Morgue and Voluntariness: The police
started questioning Sherry Bradley about the murder of her two infant
children at 2 a.m. She was taken to the Safety Building at about 3 a.m.
For the next four and a half hours there was a police officer with her
at all times, although there were substantial periods when she was not
being questioned. At 7:30 a.m. she was taken to the morgue to see the
bodies of her two strangled children. This apparently had an intense
emotional impact for she threw herself on the examination table and
was allowed to lay with the dead bodies for thirty-five minutes. Her
confession, however, was not made until approximately 2 p.m. In that
interval she was allowed some respite from interrogation and visited
with her husband and a minister.
The trial court denied a motion to exclude the confession as invol-
untary. On review the question of voluntariness was actually twofold;
first, whether the view in the morgue constituted psychological coercion
and second, whether the confession was far enough removed in time to
cure the defect. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
decision and held that the confession was voluntary and admissible in
evidence.
In considering the view of the bodies in the morgue as psychological
coercion the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:
We cannot, however, condone the conduct of the police in
taking this girl of eighteen to the morgue to view her strangled
babies. Counsel, during oral argument, found it impossible to
defend this reprehensible conduct. The visit had no legitimate
police purpose. There was no question of identification that might
have required the mother to see these children.'
42 See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-on Tools
Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963) ; C.B.S. Business Equipment Corp.
v. Underwood Corp., 240 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. N.Y. 1964); United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 D. Del. (1963), rev'd on other grounds,
378 U.S. 158 (1964).
' Bradley v. State, 36 Wis. 2d 345, 356, 153 N.W.2d 38, 42-43 (1967).
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RECENT DECISIONS
The court later said that "Had this crude attempt to overbear the will
of this defendant resulted in a confession, we would without hesitancy
declare the confession coerced and involuntary."2
A view of the body by the accused without some overriding police
purpose has consistently been held to constitute psychological coercion.
In McKinley v. Wisconsin3 the defendant's confession was held invol-
untary because she was upset over seeing the body of her boyfriend.
There was, however, testimony to the effect that the police threatened
to keep showing her the body until she confessed.
In Davis v. United States4 the defendant was resisting attempts to
secure a confession until he was taken to the morgue at 3:00 a.m. and
kept in the presence of the corpse for almost an hour. Two judges who
concurred said:
Indeed, we are at a loss to understand why the prisoner was
taken to the morgue at all at that unseemly hour of the night,
unless the agent knew something of the Indian character, and
believed that he would break down and confess in the presence
of the dead body of his victim. But, whatever prompted the ap-
pellant to confess, whether it was superstition or fear, or some-
thing akin thereto, we are not convinced that the confession was
free and voluntary, as those terms have been uniformly defined
by the courts.5
In neither of these cases, however, was there the time lag between
the visit to the morgue and the confession that existed in the present
case. The question, therefore, is not whether this was an unconstitutional
attempt to force the defendant to confess, but rather why this psycho-
logical coercion described by the Court as "crude," "reprehensible," and
a "goulish incident," did not contaminate the later confession. How
did a six hour interval constitutionally sterilize a confession that would
otherwise be contaminated by the illegal police action?
Due process includes the right against self-incrimination and de-
mands that for a confession to be acceptable as evidence against an
accused it must be voluntary. In looking at the language used by the
United States Supreme Court 7 the needed voluntariness goes beyond a
simple absence of physical and psychological coercion. The emphasis
of the voluntary requirement is on the confessor and whether he was
2Id. 36 Wis. 2d at 357, 153 N.W.2d at 43.
3 37 Wis. 2d 26, 154 N.W.2d 344 (1967).
432 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1929).
5 Id. at 863.
6 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
7 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1948) (an expression of free choice); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (the voluntariness of the confession); Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1960) (free and unconstrained choice by its
maker); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944) (free individual will);
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (whether the defendant's will was over-




capable of a free and rational decision, rather than upon the acts or
omissions of the inquisitor. It is not an objective test as is the reasonable
man standard, but subjective in that the question is whether this par-
ticular individual made a free decision. The particular acts of the
police are relevant only in relation to the effect they had on the suspect's
ability to make a deliberate choice as to confess or not.
Since, under the present rationale of coerced confessions, the focus
is upon the defendant and upon his psychological responses to the
circumstances surrounding him during interrogation, the court, in de-
termining whether the confession was voluntary, must look at the
"totality of the circumstances" s in which the confession was obtained.
All of the facts which could affect the defendant's ability to make such
a decision are relevant, and the court weighs ". . . the circumstances
of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.
What would be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be
utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal."9
Under this test, the courts are to set up a formula based on psycho-
logical variables. On one side the following pressure factors have been
considered: the hostile environment of the police station,10 protracted
questioning," threats or violence, 12 implied promises, 13 long deten-
tion,14 holding incommudicado, 15 sympathy falsely aroused,"0 threat of
mob violence, and deprivation of food or sleep.17 Factor's determinative
of the suspects ability to resist are: the defendant's age,' 8 mental capac-
ity, 9 education and emotional condition at the time of the interroga-
tion,20 fatigue, 21 and previous experience with the police.22
The pressure versus resistence test is necessarily a sliding scale in
which the individual factors are useful only in relation to each other.
This is true, partly because of the subjective nature of the factors, and
8 See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S., 191 (1957); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560 (1957) ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S 219 (1941) ; Lyons v. Oklahoma,
322 U.S. 596 (1943); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944) ; Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1960) ; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) ;
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503 (1963).
9 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953); see also Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191, 197-198 (1957) ; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) ;
and the concurring opinion of Justice Wilkie in State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284,
124 N.W.2d 47 (1964).
10 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1960).
"Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). - .
12 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) ; Davis v. United States, 32 F.2d 860
(9th Cir. 1929) ; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
13 Davis v. United States, 32 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1929).
14 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
15 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
'1 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
1"Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
28 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
19 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1960).
20 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
21 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).22 Leyra v. Dunno, 347 U.S. 556 (1953).
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partly because what istb be'determined is an individual's state of mind
-did he in fact have a free will at the time he confessed.
The impact that coercive practices will have on an individual when
he confesses will depend to some extent on their proximity in time. An
intervening interval can be considered in two ways. First, because of
the time.lag there may be added circumstances to be considered as either
reinforcing or deluting the alleged coercion; for example, food and rest,
yisiting with an attorney, or, on the other hand, continued questioning
and accusations. Second, the mere passage of time may effect the force
that the coercive acts will have on a subsequent confession. The "hap-
pening" is usually, but not always, more vivid than the memory of it.
. In Lyons v. "Oklahoma,2 s the defendant was accused of murdering
three members of a family and burning.tlheir house down to conceal the
crime. The first confession was obtained by questioning the defendant
until 2:30 a.m. and then placing a pan of the victims' bones in his lap.
This confession was not introduced into evidence, but a second confes-
sion obtained twelve hours later without any coercion was used. In
considering the effect the events of the first confession may have had
on the second the United States Supreme Court stated:
-The effect of earlier abuse may be-so clear as to forbid any
other inference than that it dominated the mind of the accused
to such an extent that the later confession is involuntary. If the
relation between the earlier and later confession is not so close
that one must say the facts of one control the character of the
other, the inference is one for the triers of fact and their conclu-
sion, in such an uncertain situation, that the confession should be
admitted as voluntary, cannot be a denial of due process.2 4
Apparently then, there is no point at which the judge can draw the
line and say that the attempted coercion is far enough removed in time
to allow the: subsequent confession to be used in evidence. Rather, he
can only consider the whole confession technique used as a single
continuing transaction to determine, not whether the atmosphere of
coercion or fear had been completely dispelled, but whether the defen-
dant had the mental freedom to confess or deny.
The affect that time alone would have on the relationship between
coercion and confession was not analyzed in Lyons because there was
"... evidence for the state which, if believed, would make it abundantly
clear that the events at Hugo did not bring about the confession at
IcAlister." This interval was the occasion for new factors which had
to be considered, and which allowed a reasonable conclusion that the
second confession was voluntary.
In Bradley v. Wisconsin, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
speaks of the six hour period as relevant by itself:
23 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
24 Id. at 603.
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We conclude, however, that this morbid bit of police work
did not wring the confession from the defendant. This incident
was far enough removed from the time of the final confession
that it did not contaminate the otherwise commendable efforts
of the detective bureau, to the extent that we are now obliged to
hold the confession inadmissible.
25
It appears from this statement that a time lapse may be sufficient to
cure a serious defect in police procedure.
It is, nevertheless, doubtful that this is the basis of their holding
that the trial court and jury could reasonably find Mrs. Bradley's con-
fession voluntary. The "totality of the circumstances" as considered by
the court included the facts that she was eighteen and had a ninth grade
education, her husband had disappeared two days before and, she
had not been able to eat or sleep during that period. The police station
environment and her prior experience with the police were also consid-
ered. The Court also placed some emphasis on the events between the
visit to the morgue and her confession-she was offered food, water,
and rest, given fresh clothing, and allowed to see her husband and
minster. Consequently, the Court may have considered time primarily
as a vehicle for additional facts.
Yet, even if considered only as dicta, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has gone beyond the United States Supreme Court, and paved the way
for a holding that an intervening period of time can nullify the effect
of coercive police procedure. Indeed, if, in a proper fact situation, such
a time lag could allow a suspect to recover any measure of free will
that may have been lost, the trier of fact should include it in consider-
ing the "totality of the circumstances."
The only argument against such a holding would be that it encourages
or at least allows police abuse. This loses sight of the goal of the test:
to determine whether the confession was a product of the defendant's
free will. It should not be a tool for punishing the police for illegal or
barbaric acts. This is not to say that the courts should conden such
procedures, nor that society should allow them, but that this is a dif-
ferent problem requiring different remedies. In our adversary system,
the state has a right to use statements freely made by the defendant. If,
in view of all of the circumstances, the confession was voluntary at the
time it was made, it should be allowed in evidence regardless of prior
police activity.
THOMAs ARENZ
25 36 Wis. 2d 345, 357, 153 N.W.2d 38, 43 (1967).
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